A new round of developer revenue disclosures illustrates why the Steam-versus-Epic argument cannot be settled by quoting platform percentages alone. Steam’s standard 30% platform cut is far higher than Epic Games Store’s 12% rate, and Epic’s first $1 million in annual gross revenue carries a 0% platform fee. Yet a smaller fee means little if a game does not find customers on the lower-fee storefront.
For cozy farming game Tiny Terraces, solo developer VuVuu said sales over a year reached $136,195 on Steam before tax, compared with $916 on the Epic Games Store. That is roughly a 148-to-one difference. It is a stark example of the practical calculation faced by a small PC studio: a larger percentage of a vastly larger sales total can still leave more money in the developer’s hands than a small percentage of minimal sales.
There is, however, an important counterexample in Kernel Hearts, a multiplayer 3D action roguelike built around magical-girl characters. Developer Ephemera Games says its Fortnite connection helped make Epic a meaningful sales channel rather than a token extra storefront. In this case, the revenue split is not the entire story—but it becomes extremely consequential once Epic is where many of the customers are buying.
The percentage is only one part of the equation
A revenue share, sometimes called a platform fee, is the slice of each sale retained by the digital storefront before the developer receives its share. The source figures in this discussion use Steam’s base 30% cut and Epic’s 12% cut. Epic also offers 0% fees on a developer’s first $1 million in gross revenue each year.
Gross revenue means the value of sales before deductions. It is not the same as final profit, and neither figure by itself describes the money a studio ultimately has available. Regional pricing, refunds, taxes, and other deductions can all change the result. Ephemera Games specifically notes those limitations in its own illustrative calculation.
Still, the basic contrast is straightforward. A developer selling a game on Steam may retain about 70% of the relevant sale before other costs. On Epic, it may retain 88% after passing the first $1 million annual gross threshold, while the first $1 million gross is not charged Epic’s platform fee. Those are meaningful differences. But the decisive question is often whether the game will actually sell enough copies on that storefront for the lower rate to matter.
Tiny Terraces supplies the clearest numerical example of that challenge. Using only the reported pre-tax store totals and the stated base rates, Steam’s much larger audience-facing result outweighs its larger cut. The game’s Epic earnings were so small that even a zero platform fee would not transform the outcome. A developer cannot save 18 percentage points on sales that never materialize.
That is the central distinction between a fee advantage and a distribution advantage. The former improves the value of each sale. The latter produces the opportunity to make sales in the first place. For many independent releases, the reported developer reactions suggest Steam’s reach and visibility remain the bigger variable.
Related coverage includes Steam's Reach Still Dwarfs Epic for Most Indies, but Fortnite Tie-Ins Can Rewrite the Math.
What the Tiny Terraces numbers say—and do not say
VuVuu’s figures are individual developer-reported results, not a market-wide study. They should not be treated as proof that every game will reproduce the same split. A game’s genre, marketing, community, timing, audience, price, and whether it is available elsewhere can all affect where it sells.
But the scale of the reported gap is useful. At $136,195 on Steam and $916 on Epic, Tiny Terraces was not dealing with a close contest that could be solved by a better fee percentage. It was dealing with radically different customer volume. VuVuu framed that frustration with a joke about funding more yachts for Valve co-founder Gabe Newell, but the underlying point is serious: Steam’s fee can feel easier to accept when it is attached to substantially greater revenue.
Other developers in the conversation described similarly low Epic contributions, claiming between 0% and 3% of their sales came through that store. Skydome, developer of The Hive, said it would gladly pay Steam’s 30% for the visibility and revenue it brings. Skydome also offered a comparison of its own annual revenue, though the wording of its reported percentage should not be treated as a fully specified sales breakdown.
These anecdotes cannot establish a universal rule. They do support a more modest conclusion: for a considerable number of smaller PC releases, Epic’s lower fee has not automatically overcome Steam’s ability to put games in front of potential buyers. A storefront can have favorable economics on paper while still serving as a much smaller source of demand.
Kernel Hearts had an advantage most games cannot copy
Kernel Hearts is unusual because one of its characters, the pink-haired Fernet, became a Fortnite skin. Ephemera Games says the outfit was popular and worth roughly $17. For people already interested in the character and Fortnite cosmetics, buying the game through Epic could be more appealing because it connected the game purchase with that in-game outfit.
That changes the usual storefront decision. Rather than asking players to install or prefer a less dominant PC store merely to buy the same game at roughly the same price, the Epic version had a related benefit for a particular audience. The studio says character design is an important part of Kernel Hearts, making the Fernet offer especially relevant to its own game rather than an unrelated bonus.
Ephemera Games reported that roughly six out of every 10 copies across PC sold through the Epic Games Store, three through Steam, and one through Xbox. The studio described that as an unusual split given the broadly similar price across storefronts. It is also a reminder that a platform ecosystem can create incentives beyond the game’s sticker price.
A tie-in in this context means a connection between products that makes one purchase more attractive because of the other. The Fortnite skin did not simply advertise Kernel Hearts; it reportedly gave a motivated subset of buyers a reason to select Epic for the purchase. That is a notably different commercial situation from a game that launches simultaneously on multiple stores without a storefront-specific benefit.
It also explains why this example should be read as a meaningful exception rather than a blueprint for every independent developer. Most games do not have a character embedded in Fortnite’s cosmetic ecosystem, much less one that players actively want. A studio cannot assume a comparable conversion path exists merely because Epic’s base fee is lower.
Why the $480,000 example matters
Ephemera Games offered a simplified scenario: 100,000 units at $20 each would produce $2 million in revenue. Under the stated simplified assumptions, Steam’s 30% fee would total roughly $600,000. On Epic, the first $1 million would have no platform fee and the next $1 million would face a 12% fee, producing $120,000 in fees. The difference is $480,000.
The arithmetic is useful because it isolates the impact of the revenue-share structures once sales volume is held constant. It does not claim that every game selling 100,000 copies will receive the same store split, nor does it account for the real-world reductions the studio flags, including refunds, tax, regional pricing, and other deductions. It is a model, not a final accounting statement.
Within that model, though, the implication for a small studio is substantial. $480,000 is money that would remain available to fund development rather than go to a storefront. Ephemera Games argues that the difference could fund another game. Whether that would be enough for any particular project depends on costs that are not provided here, but the general point holds: once Epic can deliver a major share of sales, its fee structure becomes a powerful advantage.
This is the key lesson in the contrast between the two games. Steam’s larger audience can make its fee structure commercially worthwhile for a game like Tiny Terraces. Epic’s lower take becomes transformational for a game like Kernel Hearts, where an ecosystem link apparently moved a majority of PC purchases to Epic. Neither result cancels the other out.
Practical implications for smaller PC releases
The available examples argue against treating storefront choice as a simple ideological fight or a single-percentage spreadsheet problem. Developers deciding where to sell a PC game need to distinguish between potential reach, the portion retained per transaction, and any audience-specific reason buyers might favor one version.
- Reach matters first: A lower fee cannot compensate for negligible sales volume.
- Store-specific value can alter behavior: The Fernet Fortnite skin appears to have given relevant buyers a concrete reason to choose Epic.
- Gross revenue is not profit: A platform-fee comparison must leave room for taxes, refunds, regional prices, and further costs.
- Outliers are still informative: Kernel Hearts does not represent every game, but it demonstrates that Epic’s structure can be highly favorable when the store can generate real demand.
- Multi-store availability does not ensure equal sales: The same broadly similar price across stores did not lead to a normal split for Kernel Hearts, just as availability on Epic did little for Tiny Terraces.
The discussion arrives while PC storefront strategies remain an ongoing concern for studios trying to make finite development budgets go further. It is a different kind of PC-market story than a release schedule or feature update, such as the delay of Steam adventure Become, but it gets at the same business reality: where a game launches can affect the resources available for what a developer makes next.
Steam’s dominance, based on these developer accounts, remains difficult to challenge for the typical indie game. But Kernel Hearts shows that Epic’s economics are not merely theoretical. When a game has a direct and desirable connection to Fortnite’s audience, the lower fee and annual $1 million grace period can turn Epic from a distant secondary storefront into the financially decisive one.








